Let's discuss the Storm Prediction Center (SPC)

[HazardousWx]

There are some new forecasters there. SPC lost a few longtime forecasters to retirement and sadly one of my favorite forecasters Jon Racy passed away from cancer

I was wondering. Thanks for the info. There are people in town from Vortex SE and I was hoping they would not get discouraged.

 

[bingcrosbyb]

Well, 3 high risks before April 5th. That's a new record. I haven't seen one verify quite yet though. Some itchy trigger fingers over at SPC? Who knows. Hindsight is 20/20. I do know that SPC should take a long, hard look at the criteria for elevating the risk to High given the potential for an active spring season and avoiding the cry wolf syndrome.

 

[CheeselandSkies]

The high risk on 1/22 wouldn't have been so bad if it hadn't covered so much of FL. Poor wind profiles across the peninsula kept storms from going tornadic.

They went over 2 full years without issuing a high risk, rightfully so because the atmosphere did not present a setup worthy of it. The localized significant tornado events such as Pilger, Rochelle, Holly Springs (Dec. '15), Dodge City, etc, were mostly accurately covered by 15% or 10% hatched MDT or EHN risks. Other setups that looked potentially big coming down the line (I'm particularly thinking of 5/16/15 and 4/26/16) all ended up with caveats such as stabilizing influence of early convection and/or screwed up wind profiles over large parts of the threat area.

Now we have had three high risks in less than as many months, the latter two in particular appeared highly questionable even to my amateur eyes. Sunday because the much talked about (even by local WFOs) morning to midday sig-tor threat over SE TX had already failed to materialize when the high went out, storm mode and behavior was not typical of long-tracked tornadic supercells, and there wasn't much to indicate that would change in any large-scale manner. Sure one or two of the storms could have found a sweet spot and changed character abruptly (as the Jena/Midway storm did for awhile), but that potential would have been adequately covered by the existing 15% hatched MDT.

 

[PerryW]

Well, 3 high risks before April 5th. That's a new record. I haven't seen one verify quite yet though. Some itchy trigger fingers over at SPC? Who knows. Hindsight is 20/20. I do know that SPC should take a long, hard look at the criteria for elevating the risk to High given the potential for an active spring season and avoiding the cry wolf syndrome.

We just got lucky today. Am shocked only 1o tornado reports so far at spc given the instability across middle/ southern GA and much of South Carolina. It was just as potent as March 28, 1984 and March 27, 1994........both of which produced dozens of deaths and nearly a dozen large intense tornadoes. Sometimes you just get lucky........a lot of folks south of Atlanta and in South Carolina/ S GA did today

 

[Kory]

The high risk on 1/22 wouldn't have been so bad if it hadn't covered so much of FL. Poor wind profiles across the peninsula kept storms from going tornadic.

They went over 2 full years without issuing a high risk, rightfully so because the atmosphere did not present a setup worthy of it. The localized significant tornado events such as Pilger, Rochelle, Holly Springs (Dec. '15), Dodge City, etc, were mostly accurately covered by 15% or 10% hatched MDT or EHN risks. Other setups that looked potentially big coming down the line (I'm particularly thinking of 5/16/15 and 4/26/16) all ended up with caveats such as stabilizing influence of early convection and/or screwed up wind profiles over large parts of the threat area.

Now we have had three high risks in less than as many months, the latter two in particular appeared highly questionable even to my amateur eyes. Sunday because the much talked about (even by local WFOs) morning to midday sig-tor threat over SE TX had already failed to materialize when the high went out, storm mode and behavior was not typical of long-tracked tornadic supercells, and there wasn't much to indicate that would change in any large-scale manner. Sure one or two of the storms could have found a sweet spot and changed character abruptly (as the Jena/Midway storm did for awhile), but that potential would have been adequately covered by the existing 15% hatched MDT.

Gone are the days where high risks verify. They should ONLY be used when there is >90% confidence in a destructive, widespread severe weather outbreak. We haven't had that with the 3 high risks this year. While yesterday looked potent up until the day before, I thought there was WAY too much uncertainty going into the afternoon for a high risk. Only 1/22 could be somewhat justified, but even then, veered surface winds were evident, yet they expanded down into CENTRAL FLORIDA.

The excessive use of TORE and High risks are diminishing the severity and gravity of those outlooks/warnings that were once reserved for known widespread destructive events.

 

[KoD]

I think better verbiage for the five category system would be Slight, Elevated, Moderate, High, Major.
Of course, using the same words that are used on the old system could cause confusion but honestly, most people just look at the colors anyway...

 

[Jacob]

Gone are the days where high risks verify. They should ONLY be used when there is >90% confidence in a destructive, widespread severe weather outbreak. We haven't had that with the 3 high risks this year. While yesterday looked potent up until the day before, I thought there was WAY too much uncertainty going into the afternoon for a high risk. Only 1/22 could be somewhat justified, but even then, veered surface winds were evident, yet they expanded down into CENTRAL FLORIDA.

The excessive use of TORE and High risks are diminishing the severity and gravity of those outlooks/warnings that were once reserved for known widespread destructive events.

Hard to disagree with any of this. We either need another category above high, or it needs to be reserved for obvious events.

 

[Kory]

Hard to disagree with any of this. We either need another category above high, or it needs to be reserved for obvious events.

Not sure we can keep adding categories and not confuse the ole heck outta people. I see the categories as the certainty in coverage of severe and hatching for the severity of the severe mode. Confidence was not too high yesterday. Therefore, a ENH/MDT would've been sufficient with the added hatched for the excessively large hail and potential longer track/violent tornadoes.

I think the 3 tier system worked fine.

 

[Jacob]

Not sure we can keep adding categories and not confuse the ole heck outta people. I see the categories as the certainty in coverage of severe and hatching for the severity of the severe mode. Confidence was not too high yesterday. Therefore, a ENH/MDT would've been sufficient with the added hatched for the excessively large hail and potential longer track/violent tornadoes.

I think the 3 tier system worked fine.

I wasn't suggesting adding another one, just that if high risks are going to continue to be issued are days with major questions, there needs to be another category. I liked the 3 tiered system better than the 5 as well.

 

[CheeselandSkies]

I think the 3 tier system worked fine.

I have to disagree with that a little bit. I think the old Slight risk category was too broad, covering everything from a scattered wind/hail risk to the threat of an isolated, but high-impact, strong tornado. I would like to see the probability thresholds for an Enhanced risk tweaked somewhat, though since I think they have become too common. I think hatching should be required within the 30% on the Day 3 or Day 2 outlooks to trigger an ENH, and on the Day 1 outlook, hatching should be required for wind or hail before triggering an ENH. 10% tornado prob whether hatched or not would still be Enhanced risk.

On the whole though, I'm starting to believe that the weather enterprise in general is running into a big problem and has been for a while. That is, those who are inclined to pay attention to severe weather risk; have a safety plan and want to know when to implement it are oversaturated with information, while those who don't want to know about the weather beyond whether their kids will need an umbrella or a jacket waiting for the bus tomorrow still aren't paying attention no matter what the risk category is. No matter how much the media tries to break down the expected threat level in layman's terms, they're still reaching basically the same people. Then when a non-weather-aware person's weather-aware friend or relative warns them a big tornado outbreak is expected and it doesn't happen, they have all the more reason to ignore such forecasts in the future.

 

[Argus]

Delta should have paid attention to the Moderate Risk, IMHO.

 

[PerryW]

Gone are the days where high risks verify. They should ONLY be used when there is >90% confidence in a destructive, widespread severe weather outbreak. We haven't had that with the 3 high risks this year. While yesterday looked potent up until the day before, I thought there was WAY too much uncertainty going into the afternoon for a high risk. Only 1/22 could be somewhat justified, but even then, veered surface winds were evident, yet they expanded down into CENTRAL FLORIDA.

The excessive use of TORE and High risks are diminishing the severity and gravity of those outlooks/warnings that were once reserved for known widespread destructive events.

Moderate was IMO sufficient yesterday.....and only for southeast AL/ central/southern GA/ western SC and so-central KY/ TN. Have no idea why SPC upgraded SE GA/ SW SC to High Risk at 1630z. IMO those (High Risks) should only be utilized when at least one violent tornado is certain.......which seemed to always be the case back in the day here in the southeast (3/28/84, 11/15/89, 3/27/94, 4/8/98, 4/16/98, etc). I almost wonder if the experiences of 4/27/11 causes SPC to overreact nowadays.

Folks need to realize what happened in 2011 was a freak (and a very freaky year; just like the 2011 Atlantic hurricane season).......something most of us will never see again. Even outbreaks with 40-50 fatalities SHOULD happen far less often nowadays than between 1985-2005 due to better radar and warning communications.